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1Secure Index and Data Symbol Modulation for
OFDM-IM
Yonggu Lee, Hanseong Jo, Youngwook Ko, and Jinho Choi
Abstract—In this paper, we propose a secure index and data
symbol modulation scheme for orthogonal frequency division
multiplexing with index modulation (OFDM-IM) systems. By
exploiting the notion of the channel reciprocity in time division
duplexing (TDD) mode over wireless channels for shared channel
state information (CSI) as a secret key, we investigate randomized
mapping rules for index modulation as well as data symbol mod-
ulation. Due to the randomized mapping rules for index and data
symbol modulation in OFDM-IM, an eavesdropper is not able to
correctly decide message bits even though active subcarriers and
their symbols are correctly estimated. In particular, we exploit a
characteristic of OFDM-IM which uses a fraction of subcarriers
for transmissions to enhance security of data symbol modulation.
In addition, to design a set of mapping rules for data symbol
modulation, we investigate both a random-selection based set and
a bit-mismatch based set. Through the analysis and simulation
results, we demonstrate that the proposed scheme based on the
randomized mapping rules for index modulation and data symbol
modulation has a better performance than an existing scheme
(modified for OFDM-IM) in terms of bit error rate (BER) and
successful attack probability. In particular, we can show that
the BER at an eavesdropper is much higher if the bit-mismatch
based set of mapping rules is used.
Index Terms—Orthogonal frequency division multiplexing, in-
dex modulation, data symbol modulation, physical layer security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Index modulation (IM) is an emerging key technique for
5th generation (5G) wireless networks because of its high
spectral and energy efficiency [1]. There are two well-known
applications of IM. One is spatial modulation (SM) [2] and the
other is orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM)-
IM. Especially, OFDM-IM has been intensively studied in
[1], [3]–[11]. Unlike conventional OFDM [12], a fraction of
subcarriers are active, and the indices of active subcarriers
convey information bits in OFDM-IM. Due to a high spectral
efficiency as well as a high energy efficiency, it is considered
not only for high speed wireless communications systems but
also for machine-type communications (MTC) such as body
centric communications (BCC) and smart grid communica-
tions [7], [13], where the energy efficiency is important.
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Various attractive IM-aided OFDM systems have been stud-
ied. In [14], [15], dual-mode (DM) OFDM-IM that all the
subcarriers divided into two groups are modulated by a pair
of distinguishable modulation constellations is presented to
achieve better performance in terms of reliability. In addi-
tion, for 5G wireless networks, multiple-input multiple-output
(MIMO) OFDM-IM where IM concept is combined with
MIMO transmissions to take advantages of two techniques
is proposed as an alternative to classical MIMO-OFDM in
[10]. In [11], a transmit diversity scheme for OFDM-IM
is presented to obtain diversity gain with low complexity
maximum likelihood (ML) detection.
Due to the inherent broadcast nature of wireless communi-
cations, it is vulnerable to eavesdropping on confidential data
transmitted to a legitimate receiver. Security techniques in up-
per layers have been used for the transmission of confidential
data [16]. However, such security techniques may need a high
computational complexity and a large overhead. Furthermore,
they may become prone to powerful computing attacks due
to emerging powerful computing devices [17]. To overcome
those problems, physical layer security has attracted a lot of
attentions [18]–[21]. It exploits the dynamic characteristics of
wireless communications such as random channel, noise, and
interferences for secure transmissions. In [22], the process of
generating a key from a wireless channel is introduced and
it is demonstrated that a wireless channel can be used as a
source of secret private keys for a legitimate transmitter and
a legitimate receiver.
For OFDM systems, physical layer security techniques have
been studied in [23]–[29]. In [23], a secrecy rate which
is a theoretical secrecy metric in physical layer security is
derived under various OFDM communication scenarios. It
is shown that the power allocation plays a crucial role in
improving the secrecy rate. To increase the secrecy rate under
an unfavorable channel scenario, a secure beamforming and
artificial noise which degrades eavesdropper’s channel are used
for secure OFDM transmissions based on the channel state
information (CSI) in [25]. However, it is necessary to use
multiple antennas at a transmitter for secure beamforming
and artificial noise. In [28], [29], chaotic sequences and the
CSI based interleaving are used to randomize the modulated
signal for secure OFDM systems. Particularly, in [29], the
CSI based interleaving scheme has been studied to prevent an
eavesdropper from correctly deciding confidential information
symbols in OFDM systems. However, there exists a trade-
off between reliability and security which is determined by
the number of interleaved subcarriers in [29]. In addition, to
guarantee high security and reliability, it may require side
2information transmissions between legitimate transmitter and
receiver.
There are physical layer security techniques for SM [30]–
[34]. In [30], a jamming signal is used to prevent from
eavesdropping in SM. Transmit precoding for secure SM
is introduced in [31]. In addition, information theoretical
approach for the security of SM is presented in [32], [33].
In [34], secure IM for a SM based physical layer security is
proposed where the channel between a legitimate transmitter
and a legitimate receiver is used to randomize a mapping
rule for only IM symbols in [34]. However, although the
information bits transmitted by IM can be secure, it does not
guarantee any security for transmitted data symbols through
active subcarriers.
In this paper, we propose a secure IM and data symbol
modulation (DSM) scheme to improve the physical layer
security in OFDM-IM systems. In particular, based on the
channel reciprocity between a legitimate transmitter and a
legitimate receiver in time division duplexing (TDD) mode,
the CSI based randomized mapping rules for IM and DSM
are proposed to confuse an eavesdropper who does not have
the CSI. Unlike the conventional schemes for secure OFDM
in [29] and SM in [34] where no security for DSM bits are
considered, we also ensure secure transmissions of DSM bits.
Therefore, all information bits that are transmitted by either
IM or DSM can be secure in the proposed secure OFDM-
IM without any additional side information. It is noteworthy
that we use a characteristic of OFDM-IM that a fraction of
subcarriers is used for transmissions to enhance the security
of DSM bits. The CSI associated with active subcarriers which
are determined by IM bits is used as a secret key in the
proposed secure DSM. Then, it can dynamically update the
secret key (i.e., CSI) for the coherence time without any side
information, while it is necessary to send side information to
change the secret key in secure OFDM [29]. Furthermore, we
design a set of mapping rules for DSM to improve the security
of DSM bits. To this end, we develop a bit-mismatch based
set of mapping rules for secure DSM and provide the bit error
rate (BER) performance analysis at an eavesdropper. Through
a theoretical analysis and numerical simulations, we can show
that the proposed set of mapping rules is superior to a random-
selection based set of mapping rules in terms of security. In
particular, we show that the proposed secure OFDM-IM using
the bit-mismatch based set of mapping rules can result in a
high BER at an eavesdropper even if an eavesdropper’s signal
to noise ratio (SNR) is high.
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as
follows:
• The secure mapping algorithms to protect both IM and
DSM bits are proposed under the OFDM framework
for the secure OFDM-IM scheme. To the best of our
knowledge, secure DSM for OFDM-IM has not been
studied in the literature yet and only the secure IM is
studied under the SM framework.
• For the performance analysis, we derive the BER expres-
sions at a legitimate receiver and an eavesdropper, which
represent the reliability and the security, respectively. For
pragmatic systems, we evaluate the impact of imperfect
CSI on the performance. Throughout the paper, as a
security metric, we use the BER at an eavesdropper for
uncoded systems. Unfortunately, this performance metric
is not an information-theoretic security measure [35].
However, as in [29], [34], [36], it might be used as
a pragmatic metric for lightweight secure transmission
schemes. In particular, since OFDM-IM might be used in
applications where transmitters and receivers have various
implementation constraints in terms of complexity (e.g.,
BCC in [7]), it might be desirable to consider simple,
but effective secure OFDM-IM that can securely transmit
both IM and DSM bits. Furthermore, we derive a suc-
cessful attack probability that an eavesdropper estimates
secure mapping rules in the proposed secure OFDM-
IM. It is shown that if a characteristic of OFDM-IM is
employed for secure DSM in the proposed secure OFDM-
IM, the successful attack probability can be much lower
compared to that of secure OFDM.
• To maximize the security performance in terms of BER
at an eavesdropper, we propose the bit-mismatch based
set of mapping rules for secure DSM. Employing such
set of mapping rules for the secure OFDM-IM is shown
to ensure a high BER at the eavesdropper even at high
SNR.
• In addition to theoretical and computer simulation results,
hardware experiments are performed to validate the re-
alistic performance of the secure OFDM-IM scheme by
using an Universal Software Radio Peripheral (USRP)
hardware platform.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II presents a background of conventional OFDM-IM and
presents a system model for the proposed secure OFDM-IM.
We conduct a theoretical analysis for reliability and security of
the secure OFDM-IM in Section III and IV. In Section V, we
design a bit-mismatch based set of mapping rules for secure
DSM. The simulation results to evaluate the performance of
the proposed scheme are presented in Section VI. Finally,
concluding remarks are given in Section VII.
Notation: Upper-case and lower-case boldface letters are
used for matrices and vectors, respectively. The superscripts T
and H represent the transpose and Hermitian of a random vari-
able, respectively. Denote by I the identity matrix. CN (µ, σ2)
represents the distribution of circularly symmetric complex
Gaussian (CSCG) with mean µ and variance σ2. E[·] is the
statistical expectation.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. OFDM-IM
Suppose that a legitimate transmitter, called Alice, sends
confidential signals to a legitimate receiver, called Bob, while
there exists an eavesdropper, called Eve, in a multicarrier
system. In every transmission from Alice to Bob, we consider
OFDM-IM system, where N subcarriers are divided into g
clusters [3].
Each cluster has n subcarriers so that N = ng, which is
also the size of fast Fourier transform (FFT) for OFDM-IM.
Unlike conventional OFDM, not all the subcarriers are used for
3Fig. 1: The transmitter structure of OFDM-IM [3].
transmission in OFDM-IM, where only k out of n subcarriers
are active per cluster, where k ≤ n. The combination of the
active subcarriers is referred to as IM symbol and the number
of possible IM symbols per cluster is C(n, k) =
(
n
k
)
. Thus,
the number of bits to be transmitted by IM per cluster is B1 =
blog2 C(n, k)c. The set of k active subcarrier indices in the
β-th cluster for β = 0, 1, · · · , g − 1 is given by
Iβ = {iβ,0, · · · , iβ,k−1}, (1)
where iβ,u ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n} for u = 0, 1, · · · , k − 1.
Once the active subcarriers are selected, B2 = k log2M
bits can be conveyed by M -ary modulation, which is referred
to as DSM, on the k active subcarriers. The set of k M -ary
symbols in the β-th cluster is given by
Sβ = {sβ,0, · · · , sβ,k−1}, (2)
where sβ,u ∈ S. Here, S represents the constellation of M -ary
signals. Thus, B1 +B2 bits are transmitted per cluster.
Denote by xF = [xT0 , · · · ,xTg−1]T the OFDM symbol
vector in OFDM-IM, where xβ = [xβ(0), · · · , xβ(n − 1)]T
represents the transmitted symbol vector of the β-th cluster
that xβ(iβ,u−1) ∈ S for iβ,u ∈ Iβ , otherwise xβ(iβ,u−1) =
0. For convenience denote by K = kg the total number of
active subcarriers. In Fig. 1, an transmitter structure of OFDM-
IM is illustrated.
The OFDM-IM signal in the frequency domain is trans-
formed into the time domain for transmissions as follows:
xT =
1√
K
FHNxF , (3)
where FHN denotes the discrete Fourier transform (DFT) matrix
and E[xHTxT ] = N under the assumption that E[|sβ,u|2] = 1
for all β and u. Then, a cyclic prefix (CP) of length Ncp, which
is xT,CP = [xT (N − Ncp + 1), · · · , xT (N)]T , is appended
at the beginning of xT . Note that the CP length, denoted
by Ncp, has to be longer than the length of the channel
impulse response (CIR), denoted by ν, to avoid the inter-block
interference [12], [37].
After deleting CP and performing FFT, the received signals
in the frequency domain at Bob and Eve, respectively, are
given by
yb = HxF + nb, (4)
ye = GxF + ne, (5)
where nb ∼ CN (0, N˜0I) and ne ∼ CN (0, N˜0I) are indepen-
dent background noise terms at Bob and Eve, respectively,
in the frequency domain. Here, N˜0 represents the noise
spectral density (in the frequency domain). In addition, the
diagonal frequency domain channel matrices of Bob and Eve,
respectively, are given by
H = diag(H(0), H(1), · · · , H(N − 1)) (6)
and
G = diag(G(0), G(1), · · · , G(N − 1)), (7)
where H(i) and G(i) are the channel coefficients of the
i-th subcarrier in the frequency domain at Bob and Eve,
respectively, which can be represented as follows:
H(i) =
ν−1∑
q=0
hqe
−j2pi qiN ,
G(i) =
ν−1∑
q=0
gqe
−j2pi qiN .
(8)
Here, hq ∼ CN (0, σ
2
H
ν ) and gq ∼ CN (0, σ
2
G
ν ) are the CIRs at
Bob and Eve, respectively, as in [3]. In this case, the channels
are multipath Rayleigh fading channels.
B. Secure OFDM-IM
In this subsection, we first introduce an existing secure
OFDM scheme in [29] that exploits the randomness of chan-
nels, and then propose a novel approach for secure transmis-
sions in OFDM-IM to compare the secure OFDM-IM with the
existing secure OFDM.
4Fig. 2: The transmitter structure of the proposed secure OFDM-IM.
In OFDM, the randomness of wireless multipath channels
can be exploited for secure transmissions in the physical
layer. For example, a dynamic subcarrier interleaving scheme
is proposed for secure OFDM by taking advantage of the
channel reciprocity in [29]. In this approach, at Alice, P out
of the N subcarriers of an OFDM signal are selected and
interleaved after the symbol modulation. Here, the selection of
P subcarriers and interleaving pattern are determined by the
CSI between Alice and Bob, which is assumed to be shared
between Alice and Bob based on the channel reciprocity in
TDD mode. The indicator of the subcarrier selection is given
by
I(i) =
{
1, i ∈ U
0, otherwise
, i = 0, · · · , N − 1, (9)
where U denotes the set of indices of subcarriers included
in the interleaving. Following the subcarrier selection, the P
selected subcarriers are interleaved in descending order of their
channel gains observed at the transmitter. The order of the P
subcarrier gains is renamed as follows:
[S˜(0), · · · , S˜(P − 1)]T, (10)
where S˜(p) for p = 0, · · · , P − 1 becomes the p-th largest
|H(i)|2. Then, there is a one-to-one mapping between the
descending order of U and the descending order of chan-
nel gains. For example, if P = 3, U = {3, 7, 9} and
|H(7)|2 > |H(9)|2 > |H(3)|2, the interleaved signals are
x˜IF (3) = x˜F (7), x˜
I
F (7) = x˜F (9), x˜
I
F (9) = x˜F (3), where
x˜IF (i) is a transmitted signal of the i-th subcarrier in the secure
OFDM system and the superscript I represents the interleaved
symbols. Clearly, Bob can detect the correct symbols by using
the deinterleaving based on the CSI knowledge, while Eve
could have incorrect symbols due to unknown CSI to Eve.
In conventional OFDM-IM as in [3], B1 bits are mapped
onto the indices of k active subcarriers by a look-up table
or combinatorial method, while B2 bits are mapped onto k
symbols by a DSM mapping rule in each cluster. With known
mapping rules for IM and DSM, Eve can recover IM bits and
DSM bits using the ML detection for active subcarrier indices
and their symbols as Bob does [3]. In this case, it is clear that
there is no guaranteed secrecy. To overcome this problem, we
employ the channel reciprocity to secure OFDM-IM, similar to
the SM approach in [34], where the mapping rule for IM can
be selected from a set of different mapping rules depending
on the CSI between Bob and Alice. To this end, the CSI
should change enough to generate randomness of the CSI for
secure IM and at the same time the CSI should not quickly
vary in order to satisfy the channel reciprocity constraint (i.e.,
there exists a trade-off). Then, in TDD, the channel reciprocity
implies that Alice and Bob have the same CSI which can
be used as a shared secret key for a randomized mapping
rule in IM. In [34], however, a randomized mapping rule is
limited only for IM, without taking into consideration DSM.
Unlike [34], we study opportunities to apply a randomized
mapping rule to DSM by using a characteristic of OFDM-IM.
This forms the main contribution of this work together with
a design of DSM mapping rules in order to increase the BER
at Eve. Furthermore, a successful attack probability that Eve
estimates secure mapping rules can be low by using the CSI
associated active subcarriers as a secret key for seucre DSM.
Consequently, we aim to transmit more secure bits than the
approach in [34] in the context of OFDM-IM. The resulting
scheme is called the secure OFDM-IM in this paper, which is
illustrated in Fig. 2.
As shown in Fig. 2, we assume that a block of N sub-
carriers is divided into η subblocks of Wn subcarriers (i.e.,
N = ηWn). One subblock includes W clusters and each
cluster has n subcarriers. For the secure OFDM-IM, each
cluster has individual mapping rule for secure IM, while W
clusters included in one subblock share the same mapping rule
for secure DSM. It means that there are η mapping rules for
secure DSM, while g mapping rules are used for secure IM
5in the proposed secure OFDM-IM.
1) Secure IM: There are two secrecy mapping parts in the
proposed secure OFDM-IM. In the first part, similar to [34],
we consider a random mapping rule for IM. In a cluster, before
selecting the active subcarriers, Alice estimates |H(i)|2. Then
she sorts |H(i)|2 in descending order and renames them as
follows:
[S(0), . . . , S(n− 1)]T, (11)
where S(l) for l = 0, · · · , n − 1 becomes the l-th largest
|H(i)|2, i.e., S(0) ≥ · · · ≥ S(n − 1), and l is the index
of S(l) not H(i). There is a one-to-one mapping between
{|H(i)|2} and {S(l)}. In the conventional OFDM-IM, a trivial
mapping rule is used. For example, if n = 4, k = 2,
the 0th and 2nd subcarriers are active, then non-zero signals
are transmitted through the 0th and 2nd subcarriers. On the
other hand, in secure OFDM-IM, the mapping rule for IM is
related to {S(l)}. Thus, if S(0) = |H(3)|2, S(1) = |H(2)|2,
S(2) = |H(1)|2, S(3) = |H(0)|2, subcarrier 3 and subcarrier
1 corresponding to S(0) and S(2), respectively, are active.
Since {S(l)} is unknown to Eve, she does not know the
mapping rule, leading to failed recovery of the IM bits.
2) Secure DSM: The second secrecy part is to ensure
secrecy of DSM, which is not considered in [34]. For secure
DSM, we also use a randomized mapping rule based on the
CSI associated with the active subcarrier indices. A mapping
rule for secure DSM in one subblock is determined by channel
gains associated with κ = Wk active subcarriers in one
subblock. For example, if W = 1, the number of active
subcarriers in each subblock is given by κ = k. In this case,
the possible number of secret keys for secure DSM may be
small with a few k. The order of κ channel gains corresponds
to the randomized mapping rule in the set of mapping rules.
For example, if κ = 2 and M = 2, a mapping rule for secure
DSM is selected in accordance with the order of channel gains
associated with active subcarrier indices as follows:
{|H(ι1)|2 ≤ |H(ι2)|2} → {M1 : [0]→ −1, [1]→ 1},
{|H(ι2)|2 ≤ |H(ι1)|2} → {M2 : [0]→ 1, [1]→ −1},
where ι1 and ι2 are active subcarrier indices in a subblock.
To obtain better security performance in terms of BER at
Eve, we design a set of mapping rules. For example, consider
a set of mapping rules with 4-QAM. In 4-QAM, there exist
4! = 24 possible mapping rules. Suppose that Alice uses a
certain mapping rule for 4-QAM as follows: {M : [00] →
1 + j, [01] → −1 + j, [10] → 1 − j, [11] → −1 − j}
and the transmitted symbols are perfectly detected at Eve.
If Eve chooses the following mapping rule: {M′ : [00] →
−1 − j, [01] → 1 − j, [10] → −1 + j, [11] → 1 + j},
the BER becomes 12 although the transmitted symbols are
correctly recovered. Thus, depending on Eve’s selection of
the DSM mapping rule, the BER varies and is usually high.
In Section V, we will investigate details on the mapping rule
for secure DSM.
III. RELIABILITY ANALYSIS
In this section, the BER at Bob is analyzed to evaluate the
reliability for the proposed scheme. For pragmatic systems,
we assume the presence of channel estimation errors.
The ML detection [38] is performed to jointly find the active
subcarrier indices and DSM symbols of the active subcarriers.
The ML detection at Bob can be performed as follows:
{ˆib, sˆb(i)} = arg min
ib∈I, sb(i)∈S
‖yb −HxF ‖2, (12)
where I and S denote the sets of indices and the constellations,
respectively.
Since the detection of the both IM and DSM bits depends
on the shared CSI between Alice and Bob, the CSI certainty
plays an important role in the proposed scheme. Particularly,
the use of CSI ensures to randomize the look-up table for
secure IM and DSM. Unlike the conventional OFDM-IM [3],
thus, bit errors are induced by not only ML detection errors
but also incorrect mapping rules caused by imperfect CSI. The
BER can be given by
PBe = 1− (1− PB1e )(1− PB2e ), (13)
where PB1e and P
B2
e are the bit error probabilities caused by
ML detection errors and incorrect selection of mapping rules,
respectively.
A. BER at Bob with Perfect CSI
If the channel is perfectly estimated at Alice and Bob, there
are no errors induced by the selection of incorrect IM and
DSM mapping rules at Bob (i.e., PB2e = 0). Then, from (13),
PBe is determined solely by P
B1
e . To compute P
B1
e , notice that
from H in (6), the length of the CIR determines the correlation
of the channel coefficients matrix as follows:
K = E[hhH] = FHN I˜FN , (14)
where h is a diagonal vector of H and I˜ =
[
σ2H
ν Iν×ν 0ν×(N−ν); 0(N−ν)×ν 0(N−ν)×(N−ν)]. K depends
on the characteristics of the channel (e.g., the length of
CIR). If the length of CIR is N , K becomes σ2HIN , i.e.,
the correlation of {H(i)} is zero. Otherwise, the H(i)s are
correlated.
The received signal for the β-th cluster at Bob is given by
yβ = Hβxβ + nβ , (15)
where xβ and Hβ represents the transmitted signal vector
and channel coefficients matrix corresponding to the β-th
cluster, respectively. Let hβ represent the vector containing
the diagonal elements of Hβ . Then, Kn = E[hβhHβ ] is the β-
th submatrix of centered along the main diagonal of the matrix
K in (14). As shown in [3], the BER for each cluster is the
same as that of OFDM-IM. Then, the unconditional pair-wise
error probability (UPEP) for the β-th cluster is given by
P (xβ → xˆβ) ≈ 1/12
det(In + q1KnA)
+
1/4
det(In + q2KnA)
,
(16)
where q1 = 14N˜0 , q2 =
1
3N˜0
, and A = (xβ − xˆβ)H (xβ − xˆβ).
Thus, from (13) and (16), the average BER of the ML
detection [3] is given by
PB1e ≈
1
Bnxβ
∑
xβ
∑
xˆβ
P (xβ → xˆβ) e (xβ , xˆβ) , (17)
6where nxβ is the number of possible realizations of xβ and
e (xβ , xˆβ) is the number of error bits for the corresponding
pairwise error event.
B. BER at Bob with Imperfect CSI
Notice that in practice, it is difficult to share identical
CSI between Bob and Alice due to channel estimation errors
caused by noise, interference and imperfect hardware at each
side. From this, it is necessary to take into account imperfect
CSI in deriving BER. To this end, the uncertain channel
matrices at Alice and Bob, respectively, can be modeled as
follows:
HˆT = H + ∆HT ,
HˆR = H + ∆HR,
(18)
where ∆HT = diag(∆HT (0), · · · ,∆HT (N − 1)) and
∆HR = diag(∆HR(0), · · · ,∆HR(N − 1)) are the diagonal
estimation error matrices at Alice and Bob, respectively. Here,
we assume that ∆HT (i) ∼ CN (0, σ2T ) and ∆HR(i) ∼
CN (0, σ2R) for i = 0, · · · , N − 1 [29].
First, derive PB1e with channel estimation errors in order
to evaluate the performance of the proposed scheme under a
practical scenario. As shown in [3], the upper bound on the
UPEP with channel estimation errors is given by
P (xβ → xˆβ) ≤ 1/12
det(In + q˜1K˜nA)
+
1/4
det(In + q˜2K˜nA)
,
(19)
where q˜1 = 14N˜0+4σ2R
, q˜2 = 13N˜0+3σ2R
and K˜n = Kn + σ2RIn.
Then, using (17) and (19), the upper bound on the BER of
ML detection can be found.
Secondly, consider the derivation of PB2e , which is the BER
due to mismatched mapping rules with channel estimation
errors. To square mapping rules at Alice with mapping rules
at Bob, the order of estimated channel gains at Alice should
be the same as that of Bob. The orders of channel gains at
Alice and Bob, respectively can be expressed as
|HˆT (ιT,0)|2 ≥ |HˆT (ιT,1)|2 ≥ · · · ≥ |HˆT (ιT,N−1)|2 (20)
and
|HˆR(ιR,0)|2 ≥ |HˆR(ιR,1)|2 ≥ · · · ≥ |HˆR(ιR,N−1)|2. (21)
If ιT,l = ιR,l for l = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1, Alice and Bob can
use the same mapping rules for IM and DSM. To obtain the
probability that Bob has the same order of the channel gains
as that of Alice, the correlation between the estimated CSI at
Alice and Bob is to be taken into account. Thus, we write the
estimated channel matrix at Bob as follows:
HˆR = HˆT + ∆HTR, (22)
where ∆HTR = ∆HR − ∆HT is the error matrix be-
tween the estimated channel matrices at Alice and Bob. Here,
∆HTR is a diagonal matrix whose diagonal elements follow
a zero mean CSCG distribution with variance σ2T + σ
2
R (i.e.,
∆HTR(i) ∼ CN (0, σ2TR) for i = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1).
For simplicity, it is assumed that σ2T = σ
2
R, σ
2
TR = σ
2
T +σ
2
R
and Q = σ
2
TR
N˜0
[39]. Then, as mentioned in [29], the estimated
channel gain at Bob follows a noncentral chi-square distribu-
tion with 2 degrees of freedom. Let λˆR,i = |HˆR(i)|2 be the
estimated channel gain of subcarrier i at Bob. Then, for a given
estimated channel matrix at Alice, the conditional probability
density function of the estimated channel gain at Bob is given
by
fR,i(λˆR,i
∣∣|HˆT (i)|2) = 1
σ2TR
e
−
(
|HˆT (i)|2+λˆR,i
σ2
TR
)
I0
(
Υ(λˆR,i)
)
,
(23)
where Υ(λˆR,i) =
√
λˆR,i|HˆT (i)|2
2σ2TR
and I0(x) =
∑∞
k=0
(x/2)2k
k!Γ(k+1)
is the modified Bessel function of the first kind. The condi-
tional cumulative distribution function is also given by
FR,i(λˆR,i) = 1−Q1
√2|HˆT (i)|
σTR
,
√
2λˆR,i
σTR
 , (24)
where Qθ(a, b) is the Marcum Q-function.
Let ΦT (D) and ΦR(D) denote a random event for certain
orders of D channel gains at Alice and Bob, respectively.
Then, from [29], the probability that Bob has the same
mapping rules as Alice based on HˆR is given by
P (ΦR(D)|ΦT (D)) = P (ΦR(D) ∩ ΦT (D))
P (ΦT (D))
. (25)
For tractable analysis, it is assumed that all channel gains
are independent. Then, P (ΦT (D)) = 1D! . As in [29], the
probability of the events that the orders of the channel gains
at Alice and Bob are the same can be given by
P (ΦR(D) ∩ ΦT (D)) =
∫ ∞
−∞
· · ·
∫ ∞
λˆT,D−2
f(λˆT,0) · · · f(λˆT,D−1)
{
∫ ∞
−∞
fR,0(λˆR,0)dλˆR,0 · · ·∫ ∞
λˆR,D−2
fR,D−1(λˆR,D−1)dλˆR,D−1}
dλˆT,0dλˆT,1 · · · dλˆT,D−1,
(26)
where λˆT,i = |HˆT (i)|2 is the i-th estimated channel gain at
Alice and follows an exponential distribution with parameter
σ2
HˆT
= σ2H + σ
2
T . However, it is difficult to obtain a closed-
form of the probability due to Bessel function. Instead, the
probability can be obtained by using numerical integrations or
Monte Carlo simulations. The numbers of the channel gains
used for secure IM in a cluster and DSM in a subblock are n
and κ, respectively. Then, the probabilities of the events that
orders of the channel gains at Alice and Bob for secure IM
and DSM, respectively, are the same can be given by PIM =
P (ΦR(n)|ΦT (n)) and PDSM = P (ΦR(κ)|ΦT (κ)). Finally,
the BER induced by mismatched mapping rules is given by
PB2e =
B1
B
(1− PIM )eIM + B2
B
(1− PDSM )eDSM , (27)
where eIM and eDSM are the average BERs for IM and DSM,
respectively, when Bob selects different mapping rules from
those of Alice for IM and DSM with the estimated CSI.
Finally, the upper bound on the BER at Bob with imperfect
CSI can be obtained by applying (17) and (27) to (13).
7Here, PB1e is sensitive to the SNR and channel estimation
errors, while PB2e can be largely influenced by the number
of active subcarriers and the channel estimation errors. More
importantly, PB2e or eDSM depends on the set of mapping
rules, which is also true for Eve. Thus, it might be possible to
design the set of mapping rules for more secure transmissions,
which is studied in Section V.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, the BER at Eve and a successful attack
probability that Eve estimates the secure mapping rules in the
proposed scheme, respectively, are analyzed to evaluate the
security for the proposed scheme.
A. Bit Error Rate at Eve for Security Analysis
In this subsection, for tractable analysis, we assume that for
high SNR, the BER at Eve is computed as a security metric.
Note that this is a quite favorable assumption for Eve. For high
SNR, Eve is able to detect active subcarriers and their symbols
with a high probability by the ML detection as follows:
{ˆie, sˆe(i)} = arg min
ie∈I, se(i)∈S
‖ye −GxF ‖2. (28)
However, since the mapping rules for IM and DSM are not
known to Eve, Eve has to choose certain mapping rules at
random, which lead to incorrect decisions and a high BER.
1) BER of Secure IM: Unlike Bob, even though Eve can
correctly detect the indices of active subcarriers and trans-
mitted symbols thanks to a high SNR, Eve cannot correctly
recover bits as the IM mapping rule is unknown. Suppose
that the channels for Bob and Eve are perfectly independent.
Denote by PE1e the error probability of IM bits at Eve. Based
on the analysis in [34], it can be shown that PE1e = 0.5. It is
noteworthy that unlike the approach in [34], we have secure
DSM through active subcarriers. In the next subsection, we
study the security of secure DSM in terms of BER.
2) BER of Secure DSM: Given M -ary constellation, we can
have M ! possible different mapping rules for secure DSM. In
addition, since the order of the channel power gains is used as
a secret key, there are κ! possible keys in each subblock. Let
L denote the number of symbol mapping rules used for secure
DSM. Suppose that Eve knows the set of mapping rules for
secure DSM by analyzing the received signals. For example,
if Eve performs known plaintext attacks [40], she can easily
estimate the set of mapping rules. It is a favorable assumption
to Eve. For a given Eve’s mapping rule, the BER for the DSM
bits at Eve is simply given by
PE2e =
L∑
m=1
pmP
E2
em , (29)
where pm = 1L is the probability
1 that the m-th mapping
rule is selected for DSM among L mapping rules, PE2em =
1
log2M
ρme is the conditional BER on the m-th mapping rule
use, and ρme is the mean value of the number of mismatched
1We assume that Eve knows the set of mapping rules, but does not know
which one is used for the DSM of a given subblock. Thus, we assume that
Eve chooses one randomly and uniformly among L mapping rules.
bits per symbol between the m-th mapping rule and the
mapping rule selected by Eve.
From (29), we can see that the BER at Eve is determined
by the average number of mismatched bits. As the number
of mismatched bits between the true mapping rule and the
mapping rule selected by Eve increases, the BER at Eve should
increase.
Denote by Λ the bit-mismatch matrix for a set of mapping
rules, whose element is the number of mismatched bits be-
tween the m-th mapping rule and the p-th mapping rule which
is denoted by Λm,p for m, p = 1, 2, · · · , L. Here, Λm,m = 0
and Λm,p = Λp,m. Then, we can represent the BER of DSM
bits at Eve for a given set of mapping rules as follows:
PE2e =
1
L2 log2M
L∑
m=1
L∑
p=1
Λm,p. (30)
In (30), to obtain a high BER at Eve, we have to find the set
of DSM mapping rules that have large Λm,p for m 6= p.
In summary, from the analysis, we find the average BER
for both IM and DSM bits at Eve as follows:
PEe =
(
B1
B1 +B2
)
PE1e +
(
B2
B1 +B2
)
PE2e , (31)
where PE1e and P
E2
e are the BERs for the IM bits and the DSM
bits, respectively. The BER of IM bits at Eve can converge to
0.5 under the independent channel scenario. However, the BER
of DSM bits at Eve depends on the set of mapping rules which
determines the values of Λm,p. Thus, it is important to design
a set of mapping rules for secure DSM which is discussed in
Section V.
B. Successful Attack Probability for Security Analysis
In this subsection, we analyze the successful attack probabil-
ity that Eve estimates the secure mapping rules in the proposed
OFDM-IM.
As mentioned earlier, although Eve can obtain correct in-
dices and symbols by using ML detection with high computing
power in the secure OFDM-IM, Eve cannot recover IM and
DSM bits without secure mapping rules. So, Eve can attempt
to perform attacks that Eve estimates the secure mapping rules.
If the IM and DSM bits are unknown to Eve, the probabilities
that Eve chooses the mapping rules for secure IM in one
cluster and for secure DSM in one subblock, respectively, are
given by 1
2B1
and 1L . For example, if N = 128, n = 4, η = 16,
L = 2 and B1 = 2, the successful attack probability is given
by PS,A =
(
1
2B1
)N
n × ( 1L)η ≈ 8 × 10−25. It is negligibly
small. However, if Eve knows the transmitted IM and DSM
bits, Eve can perform known plaintext attacks which make the
successful attack probability high. In particular, if IM bits are
known to Eve, the mapping rule for secure IM can easily be
estimated by Eve.
On the other hand, the proposed secure DSM can protect
the attacks by exploiting a characteristic of OFDM-IM which
uses a fraction of subcarriers for transmissions. Due to the
change of active subcarrier indices, the mapping rules for
secure DSM which are determined by the CSI of the active
subcarriers can change for the coherence time. As mentioned
8earlier, if the CSI quickly changes with short coherence time, it
can frequently update a secret key that it makes Eve’s attacks
difficult, while the channel reciprocity constraint may invalid
with short coherence time. The proposed secure DSM scheme
can make the CSI used as a secret key change dynamically for
coherence time because the secret key is associated with the
CSI of multiple active subcarriers that change in accordance
with IM bit stream. This leads us to improve the above trade-
off and makes the Eve’s attack difficult.
To perform the successful attack in the proposed secure
OFDM-IM, Eve has to estimate the secure mapping rules for
all secret key changes which are determined with the active
subcarrier indices in the proposed secure OFDM-IM. Then,
for tractable analysis, we assume that the active subcarrier
indices in one subblock are disjoint (i.e., there are disjoint
2WB1 indices). It means that the possible number of secret key
regeneration for the coherence time is 2WB1 . In addition, Eve
may need at least dM−1κ e disjoint constellations to estimate
the mapping rule for secure DSM in one subblock. Thus,
for a secure DSM mapping rule in one subblock, at least
dM−1κ e2WB1 observations are required for the Eve’s attack.
On the other hand, if the secure DSM is applied to OFDM
systems with η mapping rules for secure DSM, at least dM−1Wn e
observations (i.e., only dM−1Wn e disjoint constellations) are
required for the Eve’s attack.
The average data symbol error probability [41] of classical
M -ary PSK under perfect CSI is approximated by
PM ≈ ς
12
[
1
1 + nEsρ
kN˜0
+
3
1 + 4nEsρ
3kN˜0
]
, (32)
where ρ = sin2( piM ), ς = 1, 2 for M = 2 and M > 2,
respectively, and Es is symbol energy. In this paper, we
assume Es = 1. Then, as shown in [41], an index error
probability and a data symbol error probability at Eve caused
by ML detection errors in the proposed secure OFDM-IM are
approximated as follows:
PI ≈ ϕ
12
{[
1 +
nEs
4kN˜0
]−2
+ 3
[
1 +
nEs
3kN˜0
]−2}
(33)
and
PD =
(
1− 1
M
)
PI + PM − PIPM , (34)
where ϕ = k(n−k). Then, the probability that Eve detects in-
correct indices or data symbols in each cluster is approximated
by
PS ≈ 1− (1− PI)(1− PD)k. (35)
From (35), the probability that Eve estimates a secure DSM
mapping rule for each subblock with dM−1κ e2WB1 observa-
tions is approximated by
PA ≈ (1− PS)Wd
M−1
κ e2WB1 . (36)
The independent η(= NWn ) mapping rules are used for secure
DSM in the proposed secure OFDM-IM. Then, from (36), the
successful attack probability for all subblocks is approximated
by
PS,A ≈ (1− PS)
NdM−1
κ
e
n 2
WB1
. (37)
From (37), we can find that the successful attack probability
can significantly decrease with a large Nd
M−1
κ e
n 2
WB1 . From
this, although the modulation order is small (e.g., M = 2, 4),
we can obtain low successful attack probability with large
W (or B1). However, note that from (27), the BER at Bob
can be high with a large W due to channel estimation errors.
Therefore, to make the Eve’s attack difficult with reasonable
reliability, it is desirable to have large N and B1.
V. BIT-MISMATCH BASED SET OF MAPPING RULES FOR
SECURE DSM SCHEME
In this section, we focus on developing a set of DSM
mapping rules. In particular, to maximize the security per-
formance, we intend to maximize the BER at Eve, and the
performance criterion for the randomized DSM is derived
in this section. We develop a bit-mismatch based set and
a random-selection based set of mapping rules for secure
DSM. Particularly, the bit-mismatch based set is designed to
maximize the performance criterion and compared with the
random-selection2 based set.
A. Bit-Mismatch based Set
From (30), to obtain a high BER at Eve, we have to find the
set of DSM mapping rules that have large Λm,p for m 6= p.
To this end, the mean of the elements, which is given by
ξ =
1
L2
L∑
m=1
L∑
p=1
Λm,p, (38)
is employed as the performance criterion for secure DSM in
this subsection.
In the bit-mismatch based set of mapping rules, we choose
the L best DSM mapping rules that maximize ξ among all pos-
sible M ! DSM mapping rules. Let Ψ denote the bit-mismatch
matrix for all possible mapping rules whose element is the
number of mismatched bits per symbol denoted by ψs,q for
s, q = 1, 2, · · · ,M !. Let A denote the set of possible numbers
of the mismatched bits between two different mapping rules.
Then, the set of possible numbers of mismatched bits between
two different mapping rules is given by
A =
{ 2
M
, · · · , log2M
}
. (39)
Clearly, ψs,p ∈ A for s 6= p. The cardinality of the
set for the possible number of mismatched bits is given
by |A| = M2 log2M . From (39), Λm,p ≤ log2M and
Λm,p + Λm,a + Λa,p ≤ 2 log2M for a = 1, · · · , L due to
the symmetric relationship between mapping rules. Then, the
sum of the elements in the m-th row and the p-th column in
Λ can be bounded as follows:
Θm,p =
L∑
a=1
Λm,a +
L∑
b=1
Λb,p ≤ L log2M. (40)
2The performance of the random-selection based set will provide an average
performance that can be achieved without any optimal design of the set of
mapping rules for secure DSM. Thus, the performance of the random-selection
based set can be used as a baseline performance to see the performance
improvement by the bit-mismatch based set of mapping rules.
9In (40), when Λm,p = log2M , Λm,a + Λa,p = log2M due
to the symmetric property of mapping rules. Then, if Λm,p =
log2M , Θm,p = L log2M can be maximized. From this, we
design the bit-mismatch based set of mapping rules whose
each mapping rule has the complementary mapping rule in
the set.
Let M◦m denote the complementary mapping rule of the
m-th mapping rule which has the largest mismatched bits
(i.e., log2M ) with the m-th mapping rule among M ! possible
mapping rules. For example, for 4-QAM, the m-th mapping
rule and its complementary mapping rule, respectively, are
given by Mm : [00] → 1 + j, [01] → −1 + j, [10] →
1 − j, [11] → −1 − j and M◦m : [00] → −1 − j, [01] →
1−j, [10]→ −1+j, [11]→ 1+j. Each mapping rule among
M ! possible mapping rules surely has one complementary
mapping rule among them. Then, if L is an even number,
there exist L2 pairs of mapping rules in the bit-mismatch
based set with L ≤ M !. On the other hand, if L is an
odd number, there exist L−12 pairs of mapping rules and one
mapping rule without its the complementary mapping rule in
the bit-mismatch based set. Then, the bit-mismatch based set
of mapping rule can maximize ξ as follows:
ξ =
1
2L2
L∑
m=1
Θm,L−m+1 ≤
{
log2M
2 if L = 2l
log2M
2 − log2M2L2 if L = 2l + 1
,
(41)
where the complementary mapping rule of the m-th mapping
rule is the (L −m + 1)-th mapping rule in the bit-mismatch
set. As shown in (41), if L is an odd number, there might be a
slight performance degradation due to one unpaired mapping
rule. However, if L is not small, the performance degradation
is negligible. Nevertheless, it is desirable to have an even
L. From (30) and (41), when the bit-mismatch based set of
mapping rules is used, the BER of DSM bits at Eve is given
by
PE2e,b =
{
1
2 if L = 2l
1
2 − 12L2 if L = 2l + 1
. (42)
Let us consider a simple example with 4-QAM, where S =
{±1 ± j}. If L = 4, there are C(4!, 4) sets for the mapping
rules. Among them, a set of mapping rules which maximizes
the mean value of Λm,p is as follows:
M1 : [00]  1 + j, [01]  −1 + j, [10]  1− j, [11]  −1− j,
M2 : [00]  −1 + j, [01]  1 + j, [10]  −1− j, [11]  1− j,
M3 : [00]  1− j, [01]  −1− j, [10]  1 + j, [11]  −1 + j,
M4 : [00]  −1− j, [01]  1− j, [10]  −1 + j, [11]  1 + j,
where M3 = M◦2 and M4 = M◦1. Then, for this set of
mapping rules, the bit-mismatch matrix is given by
Λ =

0 1 1 2
1 0 2 1
1 2 0 1
2 1 1 0
 (43)
with ξ = 1. From (30), we can obtain PE2e,b = 0.5. Thus,
although Eve can detect the transmitted symbols and know
the set of the selected mapping rules, the BER at Eve can
be high as she does not know which DSM mapping rule is
actually used by Alice.
B. Random-Selection based Set
It is also possible to consider a set of mapping rules that are
randomly selected. This may provide an average performance
without any optimal design for the set of mapping rules for
secure DSM (e.g., the bit-mismatch based set). In the random-
selection based set of mapping rules, we randomly select L
mapping rules among all M ! possible DSM mapping rules
regardless of the number of mismatched bits. Thus, Λ is
random and we have to find the mean of Λ for all different
mapping rules. Then, the mean of Λ is given by
E[Λm,p] =
{
0, if m = p,
ω, otherwise
. (44)
To find ω, we select a certain mapping rule and compute the
number of mismatched bits with all other mapping rules. As
mentioned earlier, Ψ is considered to compute the number of
mismatched bits for all possible mapping rules. For example,
for 4-QAM, A = {0.5, 1, 1.5, 2}, as shown in TABLE I. Due
to the symmetric property of ψs,q , the mean of the number of
mismatched bits is given by
E[ψs,q] =
log2M
2
. (45)
From (45), for given s,
∑M !
q=1 ψs,q =
M ! log2M
2 . Then, ω can
be found as
ω =
1
M !− 1
∑
q 6=s
ψs,q,
=
M ! log2M
2(M !− 1) ,
(46)
where
∑
q 6=s ψs,q =
∑M !
q=1 ψs,q because of ψs,s = 0. Then,
from (44) and (46), the sum of all elements of E[Λ] becomes
L∑
m=1
L∑
p=1
E [Λm,p] =
L(L− 1)M ! log2M
2(M !− 1) . (47)
Thus, from (30), the BER at Eve with the random-selection
based set of mapping rules is given by
PE2e,r =
(L− 1)M !
2L(M !− 1) . (48)
For example, for 4-QAM, the BER at Eve with the random-
selection based mapping rules becomes PE2e,r =
12(L−1)
23L . On
the other hand, if M , which is a power of 2, is high (e.g., 8,
16 and so on), the BER at Eve can be represented as follows:
PE2e,r =
1
2
− 1
2L
. (49)
From (48) and (49), it can be found that as the size of the
random-selection based set of mapping rules, L increases, the
BER at Eve increases. This implies that with the larger set of
DSM mapping rules, the better security for DSM Alice and
Bob can have. In addition, from (48), if L = M !, then it is
shown that PE2e,r = 0.5.
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TABLE I: The number of mapping rules denoted by Ω
for different number of mismatched bits among all possible
mapping rules, when M = 4.
ψs,q 0 0.5 1 1.5 2
Ω 1 4 13 4 1
TABLE II: The number of mapping rules denoted by Ω
for different number of mismatched bits among all possible
mapping rules, when M = 8.
ψs,q 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
Ω 1 12 114 876 3, 855
ψs,q 1.25 1.5 1.75 2 2.25
Ω 9, 096 12, 412 9, 096 3, 855 876
ψs,q 2.5 2.75 3
Ω 114 12 1
In summary, we design the bit-mismatch based set of map-
ping rules for secure DSM which maximizes the performance
criterion, ξ. From (42) and (49), we can see that the bit-
mismatch based set of mapping rules can provide an improved
performance compared with the average performance that can
be obtained by the random-selection based set of mapping
rules.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we present simulation results with two
different channels: one is the channel where all the frequency-
domain channel coefficients are independent and the other
is a more realistic one, where the frequency-domain channel
coefficients are correlated as the length of CIR, ν, is shorter
than the number of subcarriers, N . The former channel is
ideal as the equivocation of the secret key from the CSI
between Alice and Bob can be maximized. In addition, we
show experimental results obtained using a software defined
radio (SDR) platform.
A. Computer Simulation Results
In this subsection, we present simulation results to see
the performance of the proposed secure OFDM-IM system
in terms of BER. For simulations, we assume that n = 4,
k = 2, N = 128, Ncp = ν + 6 and σ2H = σ
2
G = 1. In
addition, the SNR is defined as follows: SNR = EbN0 , where
Eb = (N +Ncp)/m denotes the bit energy and N0 represents
the noise variance in the time domain, which is given by
N0 =
(
N
K
)
N˜0.
Fig. 3 shows the BER of DSM bits at Eve with respect to
SNR when W = 2 and L = 2. In this figure, as the SNR
increases, the BER of the conventional scheme in [34], which
only has secure IM, rapidly decreases, while the proposed
scheme can maintain a high BER at Eve regardless of SNR
because of the bit-mismatch between randomized mapping
rule at Alice and an arbitrarily selected mapping rule at Eve
for the secure DSM. According to (48), if the channels are
independent, the BERs associated with the random-selection
based set of mapping rules for M = 4 and M = 8 converge
to 0.2609 and 0.25, respectively, as SNR → ∞. This can be
confirmed by the simulation results in Fig. 3. In addition, from
(42), the BERs associated with the bit-mismatch based set of
mapping rules are always 0.5 with L = 2. However, in a
practical case where ν = 10, as shown in the figure, slightly
lower BERs at Eve than theoretical results which are obtained
with independent channels can be obtained. This shows that
the channel correlation degrades the performance of secure
OFDM-IM.
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Fig. 3: BER of DSM bits at Eve for different SNR with perfect
CSI, where W = 2 and L = 2.
In Fig. 4, we show the simulation results for the BERs of
DSM bits at Eve for different values of L when W = 2,
M = 4 and SNR = 30dB. To see the impact of L on the BER,
it is assumed that the channel coefficients are independent in
this simulation. As the size of the set of mapping rules, L,
increases, the BER at Eve increases for the random-selection
based set of mapping rules. Furthermore, for a smaller M ,
a higher BER at Eve can be obtained for a fixed L in the
random-selection based set of mapping rules. As shown in
(48), if L = M !, the random-selection based set results in a
BER of 0.5 at Eve as explained in Section V. But, L should
be less than or equal to the length of the secret key, κ!. In
the proposed OFDM-IM, the number of active subcarriers in
a subblock, κ, may be small. Thus, we may have κ! < M !.
In this case, the random-selection based set does not allow
us to achieve a high BER at Eve. On the other hand, the
bit-mismatch based set of mapping rules can maintain a high
BER (i.e., 0.5) when L is an even number as shown in Fig. 4.
Consequently, it is necessary to use the proposed bit-mismatch
based set of mapping rules for secure OFDM-IM.
In Fig. 5, we display the BER of both IM bits and DSM bits
at Bob and Eve for different values of ν in order to see the
impact of the length of CIR, ν, on the secrecy in terms of the
BER at Eve when W = 2, M = 4, L = 2 and SNR = 20dB.
Particularly, the proposed scheme that uses the channels in the
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Fig. 4: BER of DSM bits at Eve for different size of set of
mapping rules denoted by L with perfect CSI where W = 2,
M = 4 and SNR = 30dB.
frequency domain as a secret key is influenced by the length
of CIR in terms of security. In addition, as shown in [3], it
can also affect the reliability which is evaluated in terms of the
BER at Bob. Since the ordering pattern of the channel gains is
diversified with the independence of the channels, it increases
the probability that Eve chooses an incorrect mapping rule
in the proposed scheme. In OFDM-IM, the performance gap
caused by a low ν may be small because it only uses a subset
of subcarriers. In this figure, it can be found that as the length
of CIR increases, the BER at Eve slightly increases, while the
BER at Bob decreases, which demonstrates that a large ν is
desirable.
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Fig. 5: BER of both IM bits and DSM bits at Bob and Eve
for different number of taps denoted by ν with perfect CSI,
where W = 2, M = 4, L = 2 and SNR = 20dB.
In Fig. 6, we show the simulation results for the BER of
both IM and DSM bits at Bob and Eve for various values of
SNR when perfect CSI is assumed with W = 2, M = 4,
ν = 10, P = 16 and L = 2. As shown in this figure,
the BER at Bob of the proposed scheme is slightly higher
than that of the conventional OFDM-IM because the set of
mapping rules in the proposed scheme cannot always use
the gray mapping. In addition, the BER of the OFDM-IM
scheme is lower than or equal to that of the OFDM with
the same spectral efficiency (1.7778 bits/s/Hz). However, the
proposed scheme has a significant performance improvement
in terms of the BER at Eve while the conventional secure
schemes in [34], [29] can have a relatively low BER at Eve.
Especially, the bit-mismatch based set which is designed to
maximize the bit mismatch in secure DSM has a remarkable
performance improvement in terms of the BER at Eve. In
detail, the BERs at Eve with the random-selection and the bit-
mismatch based sets converge to about 0.16 and 0.23 as SNR
→ ∞, respectively (which are lower than theoretical values
(0.34 and 0.5) from (31) due to the correlation of frequency
domain channel coefficients). Consequently, we observe the
secure IM and DSM with perfect CSI has a better performance
than the conventional schemes [34], [29] in terms of security
while maintaining almost the same reliability.
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Fig. 6: BER of both IM bits and DSM bits at Bob and Eve
for different SNR with perfect CSI, where W = 2, M = 4,
ν = 10, P = 16 and L = 2.
Fig. 7 shows the BER of both IM and DSM bits at Bob and
Eve with respect to SNR with imperfect CSI when W = 2,
M = 4, ν = 10, Q = 1/2, P = 16 and L = 2.
Under a practical channel estimation scenario, the proposed
scheme is evaluated in this simulation to see BER. In addition,
we compare the BERs at Bob and Eve of the proposed
scheme with the secure OFDM approach in [29]. In the secure
OFDM, both Alice and Bob select not only the indices of
the interleaved subcarriers but also the interleaved pattern
with imperfect CSI. Obviously, the BER at Bob increases
due to the channel estimation errors. Especially, the BER
at Bob of the secure OFDM is slightly lower than that at
Eve due to mismatched indices of interleaved subcarriers
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and wrong interleaved patterns caused by channel estimation
errors. Similarly, the BER at Bob of the proposed scheme also
increases because of mismatched mapping rules due to channel
estimation errors. Meanwhile, the BER at Eve of the proposed
scheme is still higher than that of the secure OFDM scheme in
[29]. Thus, the proposed scheme has a better performance than
the secure OFDM scheme in terms of security under practical
channel estimation scenarios with similar reliability.
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Fig. 7: BER of both IM bits and DSM bits at Bob and Eve
for different SNR with imperfect CSI, where W = 2, M = 4,
ν = 10, Q = 1/2, P = 16 and L = 2.
In Fig. 8, we show the impact of various parameters (i.e.,
M , W and SNR) on the successful attack probability when
L = M !. In Fig. 8 (a), the probability that Eve detects incorrect
indices or data symbols in one cluster is shown for various
SNR. As shown in this figure, a high modulation order and a
low SNR make the probability high. From (37), the probability
significantly influences to the successful attack probability
because Eve should detect the correct indices and symbols
to estimate secure mapping rules. In Fig. 8 (b), we show
the simulation results for the successful attack probability for
various SNR. We compare the successful attack probability of
the secure OFDM-IM with that of the secure OFDM with the
secure DSM scheme. As mentioned in subsection IV.B, at least
dM−1κ e2WB1 observations are required for the Eve’s attack
in the secure OFDM-IM, while at least dM−1Wn e observations
are required for the attack in the secure OFDM. Due to the
large number of observations, the secure OFDM-IM can obtain
a much lower successful attack probability than that of the
secure OFDM. Furthermore, in the secure OFDM-IM, the
successful attack probability can be reduced with large W and
M . In particular, as shown in this figure, W has a significant
impact on the successful attack probability. That is, although
the modulation order is small (e.g, M = 2), a large W results
in a low successful attack probability.
B. Experimental Results
In this subsection, experimental results are provided to
validate the proposed secure OFDM-IM scheme by using
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Fig. 8: Performances for various values of SNR, where L =
M !; (a) the probability of incorrect indices or data symbols in
one cluster; (b) the probability of successful attack by Eve.
TABLE III: Simulation parameters.
Number of total subcarriers (N) 128
Receiver power gain 2dB
IQ rate 390 kHz
Number of subcarriers in a cluster (n) 4
Number of active subcarriers in a cluster (k) 2
Number of clusters in a subblock (W ) 2
Number of mapping rules in a set (L) 2
Modulation order (M) 4
Communication distance 1m
Subcarrier spacing 1.52 kHz
Carrier Frequency 1.5 GHz
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Fig. 9: USRP experiment environment for the secure OFDM-
IM.
Fig. 10: Block diagram of the USRP experiment for the secure
OFDM-IM.
the USRP which is a SDR hardware platform. The USRP
is a flexible and low cost platform developed by National
Instruments (NI). We have used two NI USRPs whose model
is the USRP-2943R and a vector signal analyzer (VSA) which
plays a role as a computer to control the USRPs, as shown in
Fig. 9. In addition, we use channel simulator which simulates
outdoor channels from the USRP because an indoor channel
in our experimental environment which is similar to a flat
channel (i.e., ν = 1 or 2) cannot be used as a secret key in
the secure OFDM-IM. In addition, we assume that channel
coefficients which are generated by the channel simulator
are perfectly shared between Alice and Bob. As shown in
Fig. 10, USRP-A and USRP-B play roles as Alice and Bob
(or Eve), respectively. In experimental simulations, simulation
parameters are given in Table. III.
In Figs. 11 and 12, the experimental results by using the
USRPs are shown to validate the proposed secure OFDM-
IM. Fig. 11 shows the BER of IM and DSM bits at Bob
and Eve with respect to a transmission power gain in the
USRP-A when the bit-mismatch based set is used. As shown
in this figure, under the ideal channel condition (i.e., all the
channel coefficients are independent) which are generated by
the channel simulator, the BER at Eve can be maximized (i.e.,
0.5) regardless of the transmission power gain. In addition,
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Fig. 11: BER of both IM bits and DSM bits at Bob and Eve
for different transmission power gain in the USRP experiment.
under the practical channel condition with ν = 10, as the
transmission power gain increases, the BER at Eve is kept to
about 0.2 regardless of the transmission power gain while the
BER at Bob decreases. Consequently, the experimental results
confirm the validation of the secure OFDM-IM.
In Fig. 12, we depict the transmitted thermal infrared image
[42] whose size is 256 × 256 pixels from Alice and recovered
thermal infrared images at Bob and Eve, respectively, when
the transmission power gain is 4dB and ν = 10. As men-
tioned earlier, the OFDM-IM can be suitable for applications
where transmitters and receivers have various implementation
constraints in terms of complexity. In the simulation, we
assume that the infrared sensor (Alice) which is a small device
with low complexity transmits an infrared image to an access
point (Bob) with the secure OFDM-IM in the presence of
an eavesdropper (Eve). From the figure, we can find that the
recovered image at Bob is almost same with that of Alice
although the negligible noise exists. On the other hand, the
recovered image at Eve is very noisy. In summary, we can see
that under the thermal infrared transmission scenario, Bob can
correctly detect the confidential data (i.e., the infrared image)
from the received signal with the secure OFDM-IM, while Eve
obtains almost useless data from the received signal.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have proposed the secure IM and DSM for OFDM-
IM systems. Unlike the conventional scheme which only has
secure IM, the proposed scheme was able to protect DSM
bits as well as IM bits based on the randomized mapping
rule with the use of the CSI between Alice and Bob. Most
remarkably, the CSI associated with active subcarriers can
be used as a secret key to enhance the security of DSM in
the proposed secure OFDM-IM. It makes the Eve’s attack
difficult by changing the secret key for the coherence time.
In addition, to design a set of mapping rules for secure
DSM, we studied the random-selection based set of mapping
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Fig. 12: Thermal infrared images at Alice, Bob and Eve, respectively, where the transmission power gain is 4dB.
rules and the bit-mismatch based set of mapping rules. In
the bit-mismatch based set of mapping rules, we proposed
a performance criterion to choose the mapping rules that can
increase the BER at Eve. Eventually, it was ensured to make
the BER at Eve the worst (i.e., 0.5). From the analysis and
simulation results, we have shown that the proposed secure
IM and DSM scheme for OFDM-IM systems outperforms the
conventional scheme in terms of security.
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